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Abstract 
Banks have gone under increasing risk levels during the latest financial crisis. Investors’ 
confidence was shaken by the effectiveness of bank risk management practices, which has 
opened new challenges for bank management in approaching their risk. Understanding and 
communicating adopted risk management mechanisms is most likely to provide insights and 
enable diagnosis on firm risk exposure. Conveying data that reduces information asymmetry 
might be reflected on stock performance. Investigating the impact of risk management 
disclosures content on stock price change and return volatility using a sample of US national 
commercial banks during 2009-2010 shows that informative risk management disclosures 
seems to be valued by investors. This is reflected on current year stock prices and reduces the 
subsequent year return variances. 
 
Keywords: Risk management disclosure; Stock return; US banks. 
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Banks have gone under increasing risk levels during the latest financial crisis (Allen and 
Moessner, 2011; Brunnermeier, 2009; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010), which has led to 
shaking shareholders' and stock market participants' confidence in the effectiveness of bank 
risk management (hereafter RM) practices (Acharya et al., 2011; Gatev et al., 2009). This 
opens new challenges for banks’ management to control their risk (Cornett et al., 2011) and 
communicate their effort toward a safer risk environment (Allen and Moessner, 2001; 
Gorton, 2009). Understanding adopted risk management mechanisms provides insights into 
firms' risk profile and assists in asset valuation (Scholes, 2000; Beaver et al., 1989). Indeed, 
risk management is intended to eliminate financial failure and maintain shareholders value 
(Solomon et al., 2000). Disclosing risk management information, which diagnoses bank risk 
exposure (Helbok and Wagner, 2006), is likely to reduce uncertainty (Hubbard, 2000) and 
assist in evaluating management effectiveness (Lajili and Zeghal, 2005). 
Providing information that reduces uncertainty and increases the number of informed 
investors is most likely to reduce asymmetry and improve stock price (Poshakwal and 
Courtis, 2005; Healy and Palepu, 2001). As investors react directly to new available 
information (Merton, 1987), stock prices are influenced by the level of information available 
in efficient markets (Fama, 1991; Helbok and Wagner, 2006). Furthermore, information 
content influences stock price positively and the impact of high information content lasts 
longer (Jennings and Starks, 1985). Therefore, one might expect that having better content of 
risk management information might be valued by investors and improve stock prices.   
Traditional disclosure studies argue that the main objective behind revealing 
information is to respond to stakeholders’ need in terms of improving transparency, reducing 
agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Poshakwale and Courtis, 2005), facilitating 
investment decision (Meek et al., 1995), and reducing information costs in stock markets 
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(Cormier and Gordon, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001). Risk is present in almost every aspect of 
business operations (Lajili and Zeghal, 2005). Disclosing information on firm risk is 
important to any party interested in the firm (Linsley et al., 2006). On one hand, it allows 
stakeholders to monitor directors’ decisions and the risk they encounter (Linsley and Shrives, 
2005), and on the other hand, risk disclosure assists in managing uncertainty (Hubbard, 
2000). Given that risk management practices aim at reducing the possibility of failure and 
improving profitability (Solomon et al., 2000), risk management disclosure is likely to be 
considered as part of the governance structure reflecting management competency and 
success in meeting business objectives (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). Therefore, providing 
better understanding to bank risk and its complex transactions lead to having more informed 
investors (Stiroh, 2006) and hence more investors are attracted (Poshakwale and Courtis, 
2005). 
In the recent financial crisis, the absence of clear understanding of the banks' complex 
operations and the dynamics of risk management damaged the financial markets (Allen and 
Moessner, 2011; Gorton, 2009; Brunnermeir, 2009; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). The 
complexity of the business transactions promotes the need for quality risk management 
disclosures to evaluate management effectiveness and approaches followed by dealing with 
the market volatility (Lajili and Zeghal, 2005). In responding to the new challenges arising 
from the increasing risk levels during and after the financial crisis (Cornett et al., 2011), 
banks might manage the higher levels of uncertainty left in financial markets by considering 
the content of their risk management disclosure to reduce the uncertainty gap between 
informed and non-informed investors. This is likely to encourage trading and improve stock 
price (Kim and Verrechia, 1994), as risk management practices are intended to meet the 
increasing challenges of the financial crisis by reducing the chance of failure (Solomon et al., 
2000).  
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 There is ample literature that examined stock price reaction to revealed information 
or corporate disclosure in general (Palmros et al., 2004; Kothari et al., 2009; Bushee and Noe, 
2000; Akhigbe et al., 2008, etc.). However, to our knowledge, there is a lack of studies that 
investigated the impact of risk management disclosures (hereafter RMD) as an entirely 
dedicated disclosure segment on reducing market uncertainty and its reflection on stock 
prices. This paper seeks to investigate whether better content of RMD is valued by stock 
market participants and improves stock prices in a sample of US national commercial banks 
for the years 2009-2010, (i.e.) the period after the financial crisis (Grove et al., 2011; Yeh et 
al., 2011). Moreover, content analysis technique is used to measure the content of six types of 
RMD in banks’ annual reports contrary to the studies that measured single risk type (e.g. 
operational risk reporting), relied on rating agencies, or used word or sentence count to 
measure the quantity of disclosures (Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; Helbok and Wagner, 2006; 
Bushee and Noe, 2000).  
 Analysing 196 observations indicates that the content of RMD is likely to have 
improved the current year stock price proxied by two alternative return measures, as well as, 
reducing stock return variance of the subsequent year proxied by the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns. Therefore, better content of RMD seems to provide shareholders and 
investors with information enabling them to monitor management practices in terms of risk 
management. This is likely to reduce information asymmetry and uncertainty, thus improving 
stock performance. Furthermore, the reported results show the improvement of stock price 
and reduction to return variance when banks achieved better return on assets and book-to-
equity ratios. Thus, the results of the study are likely to encourage management to enhance 
their RMD content to assist in the management of agency problems and achieve better 
shareholders’ wellbeing. The economic consequences of RM disclosure imply that 
transparent risk management reporting is a preventive tool rather than an exercise to comply 
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with legislation requirement. Consequently, considering RM disclosure content is important 
for better shareholder value. 
The remainder of the paper is in four sections. The next section covers the literature 
review and theoretical framework. The third section sets out the research study in terms of 
sample data and models. A fourth section reviews the empirical results. The final section 
draws conclusions. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Banks as financial intermediaries, linking between depositors and investors, manage clients' 
assets and finance other industries as well as households (Howells and Bain, 2008; Ivashina 
et al., 2010). In general, deposits, which form the main source of funds and the main 
component of debts, are short-term debts where a significant portion is invested in loans with 
no clear understanding by shareholders and external investors of the value and risk levels of 
these investments (Gatev et al., 2009). To understand bank's risk and value its equity, 
investors and shareholders should look beyond the static balance sheet, which is limited in 
detailing entity risk (Scholes, 2000). Having insights into firm risk management dynamics 
provides understanding of bank risk exposure in relation to economic changes such as 
changes in interest rates, commodities market values, and currency rates (Scholes, 2000). For 
example, a better understanding of the maturity gap between liabilities and assets might help 
in evaluating asset values since asset value is most likely to decrease if interest rates increase 
(Beaver et al., 1989).  
Investors respond to the dissemination of information once received, and if investors 
are faced with incomplete information they will be less interested in being shareholders 
(Merton, 1987). Thus, reducing information asymmetry increases investors' confidence and 
stock liquidity; consequently stock performance might be enhanced (Healy and Palepu, 
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2001). Previous research shows that stock prices adjust according to the information 
disclosed by firms (Helbok and Wagner's, 2006; Fama, 1991; Fama, 1969). Therefore, 
uninformed investors ask for higher returns due to the higher risk associated with the amount 
of private information available to other investors (Easley and O’Hara, 2004), and favour 
dealing with financial assets having low information cost, (i.e.) available and easy to collect 
(Hubbard, 2002). In this context, Lambert et al. (2007) mention that ‘Clearly, decision 
makers in an economy make decisions on the basis of the information they have available to 
them. If this information changes, so do their decisions’ (Lambert et al., 2007, p. 404). In 
May 2006, Moody's mentioned that the level of information provided to investors is not 
sufficient, recommending more informative risk management disclosures (Lewis, 2006). 
Banks that have poor risk management disclosures, which signal their risk behaviour, might 
face higher cost of funds and difficulties in accessing capital markets (Linsley and Shrives, 
2005; Helbok and Wagner, 2006). 
Communicating risk management practices, which are intended to decrease the 
possibility of failure (Solomon et al., 2000) and convey the efforts toward maintaining a safe 
environment (Allen and Moessner, 2001; Gorton, 2009), provides investors with better 
understanding of banksꞌ complex operations (Gorton, 2009) and details needed to evaluate 
assets (Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; Scholes, 2000). This encourages trading (Acharya et al., 
2011). Having better understanding of bank risk exposure provided through risk management 
disclosures (Scholes, 2000) reduces uncertainty and information asymmetry and leads to 
improvements in stock performance (Poshakwal and Courtis, 2005; Lajili and Zahal, 2005; 
Healy and Palepu, 2001; Hubbard, 2000). Moreover, better RMD content enables 
shareholders to monitor management practices and attitude toward maintaining acceptable 
risk levels and their alignment with shareholders’ interest (Lajili and Zeghal, 2005). When 
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investors have higher certainty about the firm, based on information they have, large orders 
are placed and consequently stock price appreciates (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). 
Risk information is important to any party interested in the firm to help in the 
assessment of its risk profile (Linsley et al., 2006). It allows stakeholders to monitor directors' 
decisions and the risk they encounter; reflecting management competency and, to some 
extent, risk management could be considered as a governance factor indicating management 
success in meeting business objectives (Linsley and Shrives, 2005; Lajili and Zeghal, 2005). 
Moreover, institutional investors might benefit from risk management disclosures that reflect 
a firm's internal control mechanism in their decision making process. Detailed risk 
information is appreciated by investors, since it improves their understanding of bank's risk 
and complex transactions and consequently assists in having an effective diversified portfolio 
(Solomon et al., 2000; Stiroh, 2006). Poshakwale and Courtis (2005) show that RMD has the 
greatest impact in explaining the change in the cost of capital arguing that providing a high 
level of information to the market reduces the level of uncertainty, lowers the cost of capital, 
and consequently attracts investors. Therefore, better content of disclosed risk management 
information facilitates having homogenous belief concerning bank’s value (Baumann and 
Nier, 2004).  
If investors are using disclosed information to analyse the firm, predict its future 
performance, and consequently take their decision, then disclosures might change investors' 
expectations and this could be seen through changes in stock prices in the disclosure period 
(Benston, 1967). The content of information disclosed is valued by stock market participants 
when taking their trading decisions, as the content of disclosed information reflects firm's 
motivation toward being more transparent and that stock price is a reflection of all public 
information (Patell, 1976). Arguably, if by improving the content of disclosed RM 
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information management can reduce the agency cost and enhance the firm's value, then 
agency theory can explain management intention to disclose better content of RM 
information. Therefore, we expect that management that avoids holding information and 
discloses better content of RM information might reduce information asymmetry, improve 
stock return, and reduce return volatility. This leads to our hypotheses: 
HYPOTHESIS 1.  The better the content of risk management disclosures, the higher the stock 
return. 
HYPOTHESIS 2. The better the content of risk management disclosures, the lower the stock 
return volatility. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample Selection and Data Collection 
To test the hypotheses, we have drawn a sample from the active listed US national 
commercial banks. The purpose of selecting only national commercial banks is to have 
coherent sample observations subject to similar regulations and providing similar services. 
Banks are then sorted according to their total assets in year 2009 and banks having total 
assets less than one billion are omitted to avoid small banks and ensure coherence sample. 
The initial sample size is 214 observations in both years, (i.e.) 2009 and 2010. 
As a tool to communicate firms' specific information, annual reports are used by 
previous researchers to measure disclosures (Perignon and Smith, 2010; Linsley and Shrives, 
2006; Ahmed et al., 2004) since disclosures form a vital part of them (Gul and Leung, 2004). 
Thus, the management discussion and analysis section in banks annual reports and forms 10-
K are reviewed to measure the content of RMD. Financial information to compute stock price 
change and the control variables is obtained from Thomson ONE Banker database. Due to 
missing data, closures, and bank mergers, the final examined sample size in both years after 
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omitting observations with missing data comprises of 196 observations having asset size 
greater than one billion.  
Stock Price Changes (Stock Return) 
In efficient capital markets, stock prices respond to newly revealed information reflecting 
investors' reaction to the new available information and the efficiency of the market (Ross et 
al., 2005; Patell, 1976). The change in stock value implies a new assessment to the predicted 
future cash flows and consequently mirroring firms' current and future performance; in other 
words, stock prices are a reflection of the firms' overall market valuation (Klassen and 
Mclaughlin, 1996). Improvement in stock prices is not only important to enhance 
shareholders’ value but also important to increase stock market liquidity (Breen et al., 2002) 
and correct asset undervaluation, which harms the firm and its management specially when 
raising equity capital or approaching the expiry of stock options (Healy et al., 1999). Previous 
research shows that releasing firms' information is sufficient to explain changes in stock 
prices (Lobo, 2000; Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997; Chambers and Penman, 1984). In 
estimating our relationships, stock return and the variation in stock return are used (Geld and 
Zarowin, 2002; Lamber et al., 2007; Pereira and Zhang, 2010; Anderson and Fraser, 2000).  
Risk Management Disclosures  
Providing information that enables investors to evaluate bank activities and anticipate 
expected future risk levels acts as a process that disciplines both the market and bank 
management (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996). The extent and comprehensiveness of revealed 
mandatory information is defined by management, the ultimate owner of information, and, 
therefore, the voluntary aspect could be found in mandatory disclosure since more disclosures 
enhance readers' knowledge of the firm's practices and reflect transparency (Kent and 
Stewart, 2008). Pillar 3 of Basel emphasizes the importance of providing better disclosures in 
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order to act as market discipline, while Sarbanes-Oxley standards hold firms' management 
accountable to disclose RM information and liable for non-compliance (Helbok and Wagner, 
2006). 
The content analysis approach is adopted in measuring the content of RMD in the 
management discussion and analysis section of banks' annual reports. In disclosing risk 
management activities, management is most likely to reveal information illustrating a firm's 
risk exposure and the approach followed to identify, monitor and mitigate risk ‘Disclosures 
related to risk management have to include the risks to which banks are exposed and the 
techniques used to identify, measure, monitor, and control these risks’ (Helbok and Wagner 
2006, p.6).  
Communicated information is addressed to a wide range of users including but not 
limited to shareholders, investors, and creditors. Each group of users has different needs and 
is looking for different types of information. This limits the ability to classify the best 
reported data that might be useful to interested parties (Benston, 1967). Previous studies 
highlight the interest of different groups to different information types and the importance of 
each information type on firms' performance. For example, portfolio quality information and 
risk levels assist in managing clients' uncertainty (Hubbard, 2000), while financial indicators, 
such as maturity gap and non-performing loans, impact negatively on investors (Linsley et 
al., 2006). Ahmed et al. (2004) conclude that maturity-gap disclosure could be more 
informative than the information presented in banks' financial statements. Moreover, risk 
disclosures that reflect firms' internal control mechanism and decision making process are 
valued by institutional investors (Solomon et al., 2000). Jorion (2002) suggests that value at 
risk disclosure assists in forecasting the trading revenue volatility due to its importance in 
comparing the risk of banks' trading portfolios. 
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We classify RMD into six categories according to risk types and covering information 
disclosed regarding the management of credit risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk, market 
risk, legal and compliance risk, and operational risk (COSO, 2009; Linsley et al., 2006; 
Baumann and Nier, 2004; Ahmed et al., 2004; Jizi, 2015; Nehme et al., 2016). In view of the 
absence of a clear guide that assists in prioritizing among the different types of disclosed RM 
information or giving different weight to each type, the study provides equal weighting across 
the examined types, as each disclosure type is likely to be of equal importance. This avoids 
the inherent subjectivity in providing weights for each disclosure type and provide equal 
importance to all users (Raffournier, 1995). 
The narrative content of each risk category is scored from zero to three according to 
the thoroughness of discussion (risk management indicators and discussion topics are 
illustrated in appendix A). Therefore, a score of one point is given if the bank, when 
discussing a risk management type, provides definition for the risk and its scope accompanied 
by a brief discussion on how they are approaching it. If the discussion is extended to include 
the policies, frameworks, and techniques used (e.g. stress testing, calculating value at risk, 
portfolio classification and concentration, and net portfolio value estimation and earning 
simulation) to assess their risk exposure as well as discussing the results of the testing 
conducted, then the disclosure is given a score of two points. If the assumptions employed 
and considered when applying the testing or adopting a framework and/or the rationale 
behind selecting a testing technique in particular is discussed then the disclosure is given a 
score of three points. An additional point is given if numerical figures are disclosed 
supporting the narrative discussion and another point if the figures are compared with 
previous years' results or projected target figures. Therefore, a maximum of five points could 
be achieved by each category and thirty as a maximum score. The final score used in the 
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analysis is computed by dividing the sum of points awarded over the maximum score a bank 
can achieve, (i.e.) thirty points.  
The advantage of the adopted method over using disclosure scores rated by agencies, 
or using word or sentence count scores, is that content analysis reflects both quantity and 
quality (Hasseldine et al., 2005). Moreover, the followed coding approach is clear and 
overcomes sample selection limitation if selected banks were not rated by the rating agency. 
Disclosure score reliability 
Although full assurance could not be achieved (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Jizi et al., 2016), 
Krippendorff's alpha is used to measure scoring subjectivity and reliability (Krippendorff, 
2007). Several disclosure studies (e.g. Hasseldine et al., 2005; Holder-Webb et al., 2009; Jizi 
et al., 2014 and Newson and Deggan, 2002) used Krippendorff’s alpha to measure inter-rate 
agreement considering alpha that ranges between 70% and 85% sufficient and the scores are 
reliable for further analysis. 
Twenty annual reports covering 10% of the examined annual reports have been 
randomly selected and have been provided to two independent coders to test for disclosures 
score reliability. The approach followed to score RMD along with the scoring sheet has been 
explained to the coders. The score provided by the two independent coders' along with the 
score computed by the author are used to test scoring process reliability. Since the first 
reliability test reports alpha less than 75%, reconciliation between the three scores is 
performed. The scores with variation greater than 30% are selected and the coding is 
analysed with the other coders to identify the reason behind such differences. After agreeing 
on the adjusted scores another reliability test has been performed and reported alpha in the 
second round is 81.5%. 
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REGRESSION MODELS 
The regression models estimating the relationships between RMD, stock-return, and return 
volatility are as follows:  
Model (1) PCh = α +β1 RMD+ β2 ROA+ β3 Lev+ β4 BtoM+ β5 AG+ έ 
Model (2) RSD = α +β1 RMD+ β2 ROA+ β3 Lev+ β4 BtoM+ β5 AG+ β6 Size+ έ 
Where: 
PCh  change in stock price measured as the difference between the closing-price of the 
observed year and preceding year, scaled by the preceding year closing-price. As an 
alternative measure, dividends are added to the numerator to compute the total 
investment return. 
RSD       standard deviation of the monthly stock returns for a given firm i in a certain year t. 
α            the intercept 
β1 …. βn     the regression coefficients 
έ                 the error term 
Control variables 
Firms' growth signals their potential for new investment opportunities generating expected 
future return and consequently enhancing equity value as well as reducing return volatility 
(Kothari et al., 2009; Pilotte, 1992). According to agency theory, corporate managers benefit 
from new investment opportunities in reducing agency cost by utilizing their available free 
cash flow in new investments (Sibilkov, 2009; Fama and French, 2002). Pilotte (1992) finds 
that firms that witnessed considerable growth are able to eliminate declines in stock prices, 
while Bushee and Noe (2000) mention that better book-to-market value is likely to lower 
stock return volatility. High return on assets reduces spread, signals a firm's efficiency, and 
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provides compensation for additional risk-taking (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996). On the other 
hand, poor-performing companies are more sensitive to financial difficulties and lack 
resistance to external shocks (Baek et al., 2004). In this context, Berger and di Patti (2006) 
mention that profit efficiency enhances expected returns and might protect the firm from 
expected crisis. 
Leverage could be seen as a tool to manage agency conflicts and consequently 
enhance stock prices (Kochhar, 1996). The presence of leverage enforces corporate managers 
to utilize their assets effectively and eliminate inefficient expenditures in order to fulfil 
commitments and avoid settlement delays or even bankruptcy (Kochhar, 1996). In the recent 
financial, crisis liquidity risk came to be of greater concern stressing on asset pricing 
(Acharya et al., 2011; Allen and Moessner, 2011). As leverage is one of the measures that 
predict bank failure, increasing bank’s risk and impacting on its market value (Kothari et al., 
2009; Helbok and Wagner, 2006), we  use leverage to control for liquidity. Large banks 
might experience less return volatility compared to small banks (Baumann and Neir, 2004) 
due to their ability in diversifying their investments (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997) and 
obtaining external financing (Baek et al., 2004). Moreover, Anderson and Fraser (2000) argue 
that in addition to the diversification effect bank size might affect its risk level due to its 
ability to access capital markets when liquidity is needed.  
The measurements of the independent variables are illustrated in table 1. 
 [Table 1 about here] 
RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
The stock price change in the examined sample varies between (1.07) and (-1.00). Only 24% 
of the banks covered in the examined sample witnessed enhancements in their stock prices 
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during 2009 compared to 65% in 2010. The mean is (-0.06) and the standard deviation is 
(0.41). On the other hand, the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns varied between 
zero and (0.49) having a mean of (0.123) and standard deviation of (0.082). 
All banks covered in the sample revealed information related to their risk 
management practices with clear variation in the comprehensiveness and the quality of the 
disclosed information. The variation is in both the level of information disclosed and the 
types of risks management disclosed. The highest risk management score is 0.9 across the 
defined risk types and the lowest score is 0.17 points. 42% of the examined banks obtain 
RMD score above the mean (0.47). The standard deviation is (0.11) showing the level of 
variation between scores. These results highlight the issue of the voluntary aspect in 
mandatory disclosure mentioned by Kent and Stewart (2008). 
A lens on the control variables shows that return on assets varied widely during 2009-
2010. The highest ROA is (3.69) and the lowest was (-9.53) with a standard deviation of 
(1.88).  The proportion of banks that were able to have positive ROA during 2009 and 2010 
was (60%) and (67%) respectively. Leverage ranges between (1.01) to (0.08) having a mean 
of (0.9) and standard deviation of (0.06). The book-to-market ratio varies between (28.45) 
and (-2.68). The mean of the sample is (1.89) and the standard deviation is (2.75). Asset 
growth varies from (0.81) to (-0.22) having a sample mean of (0.02).  
[Table 2 about here] 
Tests of Hypotheses 
The relationships between stock price changes and the content of RMD are examined by 
employing the linear regression analysis with robust standard error. This section illustrates 
and analyses the results obtained from the employed regressions. 
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Table (3) below relaxes the assumption of mulicollinearity between the independent 
variables (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Jing et al., 2008). However, the correlation between the 
ROA and the book-to-market value of equity (-0.70) might be of a concern. Therefore, ROA 
and book-to-market value will be introduced gradually into the examined model since 
collinearity between variables could also be detected if the coefficient values of the 
independent variables are affected with the addition or the removal of any examined variable 
(Brooks, 2008). The variance inflation factor (VIF) test reports results that vary between 1.16 
and 2.9 which are considered acceptable results, suggesting no serious multi-collinearity 
problem (Gujarati, 2003; Jing et al., 2008). We test for heteroscedasticity using the Breusch-
Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity. With the exception of the standard 
deviation of stock returns 2010-2011, no threat of heteroscedasticity was reported.  
[Table 3 about here] 
To estimate the association between RMD content and stock return, three alternative 
measures are used. Table (4) shows the estimated relationships using price change (return), 
price change with dividends (indicating the total investment return), and the standard 
deviation of the monthly stock returns for the following year. In all estimated equations, 
variables with potential risk of multicollinearity are introduced gradually in order to monitor 
their impact on other variables and identify irregularities.   
[Table 4 about here] 
The results show that the overall explanatory power of equation II and IV is 31% and 
34% respectively and significance at (p < 0.01). With respect to the equations estimating the 
impact of RMD on stock return standard deviation along with the control variables, equation 
VI and VII are significant at (p < 0.01) explaining 51% of the return variance. The content of 
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RMD is statistically significant and positively associated with stock price across the two 
measures used, (i.e.) price change with and without dividends, at (t= 1.95, p < 0.1) and (t= 
2.01, p < 0.05) respectively. On the other hand, RMD content is negatively associated with 
the following year stock return variance at (p < 0.05). Return on asset is significant at (p < 
0.01) across all estimated relationships. Book-to-market value of equity is also found to be 
significant at (p < 0.01) across all equations with the exception of the equations estimating 
the stock return standard deviation where it is significant at (p < 0.1). In accordance with the 
predicting signs, book-to-market value is negatively associated with price change and 
positively associated with return variance. On the other hand, debt to assets is only associated 
with price change when dividends are included, (i.e.) total investment return, while asset 
growth is only associated with price change without dividends at (p < 0.1).  
The reported results provide evidence supporting the set hypotheses proposing a 
positive association between the content of disclosed risk management information and 
changes in stock prices on the one hand, and a negative association with return variances on 
the other hand. These results suggest that better content of risk management disclosure is of 
value and likely to be considered when valuing assets. That is, having better understanding of 
bank risk exposure provided through risk management disclosures (Scholes, 2000) is likely to 
reduce uncertainty and information asymmetry and leads to improvements in stock 
performance (Poshakwal and Courtis 2005; Lajili and Zahal 2005; Healy and Palepu, 2001; 
Hubbard, 2000).Therefore, the transparency and comprehensiveness in disclosing risk 
management information, which signals bank risk behaviour (Helbok and Wagner, 2006), is 
appreciated and reflected on stock performance by improving current year stock prices and 
decreasing the return volatility of the following year. 
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In line with agency theory, return on assets is highly significant thereby improving 
stock price and reducing return variance. Higher return seems to enhance investorsꞌ 
confidence in stocks, reduce the level of monitoring to be exercised by shareholders, and 
consequently reduces agency cost and enhances a firm's equity value. This is in line with 
Baumann and Nier (2004), Berger and di Patti (2006), and Gelb and Zarowin (2002) 
indicating that firms with higher profitability have lower variation in their stock returns. 
Banks that achieve better growth ratios are able to improve their stock prices or eliminate 
negative price downturn on one hand, and decrease return volatility on the other hand. The 
results reconcile with Pilotte (1992), Gelb and Zarowin (2002), and Kothari et al. (2009) 
showing a positive relationship between stock price changes and higher growth ratios.  
The study examines potential solutions that assist in the management of the increasing 
risk levels, shaken confidence, and falling market values resulting from the recent financial 
crisis. It contributes toward better understanding to the influence of RMD content and its 
substantive consequences on shareholder value. In addition, by examining this relation, the 
paper seeks to provide better understanding on how investors recognize disclosed RM 
information; whether they are considered as a valuable and reliable source when assessing 
bank risk and building trading decisions. The obtained results might be valuable to banks' 
management in understanding information users' reaction to disclosed RM information and 
what effort could be exercised to maximize banks’ benefit from their disclosures.  
Additional Testing 
To test the robustness of the estimated results and ensure that RMD will continue to be 
influential on stock return and risk regardless of the crisis-years, an interaction variable is 
introduced between years and RMD. Year 2009 was given a value of one and zero otherwise. 
RM disclosure’s coefficient estimate remains significant in equation II and IV (Table 5) 
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implying that RMD has effect on stock return. The results show that RMD and Year-RMD 
variables are statistically significant. This suggests that in year 2010, when the interaction 
variable has a value of zero, RMD coefficient explains the association between RMD and 
stock return. While, in year 2009, which is closer to the crisis and where the reliability of the 
disclosed information is doubtful, the influence of RMD is lower as it is substantially reduced 
by the negative coefficient of the Year-RMD interaction variable. When estimating equations 
VI and VII, table (5) shows that the results are consistent with our previous findings and 
Year-RMD interaction variable is not statistically significant. A second interaction variable 
between ROA and RMD is introduced to examine the effect of profitability on the 
relationship between RMD and stock performance. First ROA was transferred into a dummy 
variable, giving a value of 1 for profitable banks and 0 otherwise. Then the interaction 
variable between RMD score and ROA dummy variable was developed. Table (5) shows that 
while RMD coefficient is not significant in equation I and III, a positive and significant 
association is documented between ROA-RMD interaction variable and stock return. That is, 
for profitable banks, better content of RMD has an impact on stock return. This suggests that 
investors in general might give more consideration and higher reliability to the disclosed RM 
information when banks have positive profitability; as the implemented RM practices were 
sufficient to assist in generating positive results and maximizing shareholders interest. On the 
other hand, RMD continue to be significantly related to stock return standard deviation as 
illustrated in table (5), equation V. This suggests that banks disclosing better content of RMD 
are more successful in reducing stock return volatility irrespective of their profitability level, 
as the impact on stock return volatility is not influenced by bank’s ROA.  
[Table 5 about here] 
Communicated information is addressed to a wide range of users, including but not 
limited to shareholders, investors, and creditors. Each group of users has different needs and 
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is looking for different types of information. This limits the ability to classify the best 
reported data that might be useful to interested parties (Benston, 1967) and encourage the use 
of aggregate scores. However, to have further insights into the influence of each risk 
management disclosure type on stock performance, we run twelve regressions summarized in 
table (6). Table (6) shows that credit, liquidity, interest rate, and legal risk management 
disclosures contribute in enhancing sock return. The results also suggest that liquidity, 
interest rate, and operational risk management disclosures assist in the management of stock 
return volatility. The highest coefficient value is to the liquidity risk management, which was 
of high concern after the 2008 financial crisis (Allen and Moessner, 2011; Acharya et al., 
2011). 
[Table 6 about here] 
CONCLUSION 
The role of banks as financial intermediaries investing depositors assets (Howells and Bain, 
2008; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010) requires a high level of transparency to provide 
shareholders as well as investors understanding on the value and risk level of the investments 
undertaken by the bank (Gatev et al., 2009). This turns out to be more crucial during and after 
the financial crisis where banks were facing increasing risk levels (Allen and Moessner, 
2011; Brunnermeier, 2009) affecting their equity value (Acharya et al., 2011; Ivashina and 
Scharfstein, 2010).  
To understand bank risk, a look beyond the static financial statements should be 
considered (Scholes, 2000) in order to explore bank-risk dynamics and investments-risk 
exposures (Beaver et al., 1989; Scholes, 2000). In this concern, banks disclose information on 
their risk management practices, which are intended to mitigate risk and reduce failure 
possibility (Solomon et al., 2000). Revealing such information that illustrates portfolio 
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quality and risk levels manages uncertainty (Hubbard, 2000) and is requested by all interested 
parties to assess risk profile (Linsley et al., 2006). 
This paper investigates whether better content of risk management disclosures 
influence stock price and return volatility, targeting a unique sample of US national 
commercial banks in the period just after the financial crisis, (i.e.) years 2009 and 2010 
(Grove et al., 2011; Yeh et al., 2011). The targeted sample and disclosure type are not the 
only contribution of the paper, which also contributes to the literature by employing the 
content analysis technique to measure disclosure content rather than relying on agency rating 
or using word and sentence count to proxy for disclosure content (Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; 
Helbok and Wagner, 2006; Bushee and Noe, 2000), as such techniques tell little about quality 
(Hasseldine et al., 2005).  
In line with the set hypotheses, our findings indicate that banks that disclosed better 
content of risk management information provide investors with needed information to 
evaluate their financial assets, reducing uncertainty concerning their risk environment, and 
enhancing the ability to monitor management practices. As a result, this was reflected in 
stock prices, improving total investment return. Second, the results suggest that a 
comprehensive content of RMD was valued by investors and conveyed higher trust that 
reduces the volatility in stock return for the coming year. These results add significant input 
to understanding the impact of a financial disclosure segment on stock behaviour and the 
importance of transparency in enhancing shareholdersꞌ value. This promotes RM disclosure to 
be considered as a preventive tool rather than an exercise to comply with legislation 
requirement, and considering its content important for better shareholder value. The 
suggested results might be useful for both investors and bank management. Indeed, improved 
stock price and lower return volatility signal relatively bank risk and performance.  
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As any other research, the study has its limitations and expanding opportunities could 
be identified. First, a longer sample period after the financial crisis could be targeted to 
estimate relationships and could have additional evidence on the consistency of the results 
reported. Having a wider time period will enable using different econometric techniques to 
reconcile results as well as identifying trends. Second, the sample could be enlarged to 
include other types of US banks and/or non-US banks to draw more generalized conclusions. 
Third, the current paper examined the impact of risk management disclosures on stock return 
volatility, (i.e.) idiosyncratic risk, while other risk measures such as beta could be used to 
understand its effect on other types of risk.  
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APPENDIX  
Risk Management Types Discussion Topics 
 Risk type Risk management indicators 
1 Credit risk 
 Definition 
 Policies developed to ensure loans are extended within tolerable risk 
measures 
 Mechanisms used to measure various credit risks (credit rating and 
related discussions and how they are impacting cost of funds the 
ability to raise fund)  
 Monitoring tools to assess the portfolio performance (presentation to 
credit portfolio classified by industry, credit type, geographical 
concentration etc.) 
 Loan restructuring (nonperforming loans and borrowers 
experiencing financial difficulties) 
 Provisions for credit losses   
2 Liquidity risk 
 Definition 
 The framework implemented to ensure cash availability to lenders 
and depositors (discussion on employed liquidity testing and stress 
testing and the underlined assumptions) 
 The role of ALCO committee 
 Cash and liquidity sources such as “available for sale securities” 
 Contingency funding plans, how the bank can response to liquidity 
stress events at various levels of severity 
3 
Interest rate 
risk 
 Definition 
 Describing the techniques used to measure and monitor changes in 
interest rate  
 re-pricing assets,  
 liabilities and derivatives,  
 earning simulation modelling and related assumption 
 net portfolio value estimation and discussion on 
assumptions used in the estimation 
 Tools adopted to manage the interest rate risk 
4 Market risk 
 Definition 
 Trading and non-trading portfolios market risk exposures 
 Describing the tools used to monitor and manage risk exposures 
 Discussions on foreign exchange risk  
 Discussion on trading risk management (value at risk disclosure if 
available) 
 Discussion on commodity risk 
 Discussion on equity risk 
 Discussion on issuer credit risk (if available) 
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 Risk type Risk management indicators 
5 
Operational 
risk 
 Definition 
 Policies and procedures followed to manage operational risk 
 Trainings provided to minimize the occurrence of operational risk 
 The assessment and reporting of operational risk 
 Identifying and managing key human capital risks  
 Presenting information about employees turnover rates and 
performance 
 Policies and procedures adopted to mitigate IT risks 
 Tests and procedures employed to ensure the adequacy of IT 
controls 
6 
Legal and 
compliance 
risk 
 Definition 
 Policies and procedures followed to manage fiduciary risk 
 Categories of risks covered under the fiduciary risk policies and 
procedures 
 The role of fiduciary risk management function (if any) 
Source: COSO, 2009; Linsley et al., 2006; Baumann and Nier, 2004; Ahmed et al., 2004; Jizi, 2013. 
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TABLE 1 
Independent variables measurement 
Variable name 
Variable 
code 
Variable descriptions 
Predicted sign 
PCh        RSD 
Risk management 
disclosure score 
RMD 
Risk management disclosures score measured 
as the ratio of the points obtained on the 
content of risk management disclosure types 
over the maximum points a bank can achieve 
+ - 
Profitability ROA Net income over total assets + - 
Leverage Lev Debt divided by total assets - + 
Book-to-market 
value of equity 
BtoM 
The value of equity divided by the market 
value of equity (market capitalization) 
- + 
Asset Growth AG 
The difference in asset size between the 
beginning and end of year divided by the 
beginning of year asset size 
+ - 
Size Size Natural logarithm of current year total assets  - 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Descriptive statistics 
Description 
Price 
Change 
Price  
Change 
with 
dividends 
Return 
S.D 
2010-
2011 
RMD ROA Lev 
Book-
to-
Market 
Asset 
Growth 
Assets  
(billions) 
Mean -0.06 -0.043 0.123 0.47 0.32 0.90 1.89 0.02 94.2 
Mode 0 0 0.088 0.50 0.43 0.93 14.88 0 6.05 
Median -0.02 -0.010 0.1 0.47 0.4 0.90 1.063 0.01 4.04 
Maximum 1.07 1.078 0.49 0.90 3.69 1.01 28.45 0.81 2,264 
Minimum -0.86 -0.806 0 0.17 -9.53 0.08 -2.68 -0.22 1.015 
Standard 
deviation 
0.41 0.41 0.082 0.11 1.88 0.06 2.75 0.11 0.78 
Skewness 0.12 0.140 2.10 0.73 -1.9 -10.6 6.04 2.34 1.53 
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TABLE 3 
Correlations matrix 
Variables VIF RM ROA 
Debt to 
Assets 
Book-to-
Market 
Asset 
Growth 
Log 
Assets 
RM 1.72 1.000      
ROA 1.32 0.149 1.000     
Debt to Assets 2.85 -0.160 -0.165 1.000    
Book-to-market 
value of equity 
2.9 -0.183 -0.703 0.143 1.000   
Asset Growth 1.16 -0.114 0.335 0.034 -0.338 1.000  
Log Assets 1.77 0.457 0.139 -0.379 -0.190 -0.108 1.000 
 
TABLE 4 
Linear regression analysis of the relationship between stock price changes, return S.D and 
RMD content along with the selected control variables. 
Dependent 
variable  
Price change 
Price change with 
dividends 
Return S.D 2010-2011 
 
Equation 
I. 
Equation 
II. 
Equation 
III. 
Equation 
IV. 
Equation 
V. 
Equation 
VI. 
Equation 
VII. 
Independent 
variables 
Coeff. 
t-value 
Coeff. 
t-value 
Coeff. 
t-value 
Coeff. 
t-value 
Coeff. 
t-value 
Coeff. 
t-value 
Coeff. 
t-value 
Constant 
-0.601 
-1.91* 
0.732 
1.19 
-0.498 
-1.32 
1.165 
1.90** 
0.310 
0.47 
-0.158 
-0.51 
-0.159 
-0.50 
RM 0.530 
2.30** 
0.444 
1.95* 
0.535 
2.46** 
0.428 
2.01** 
-0.119 
-2.76*** 
-0.088 
-2.29** 
-0.089 
-1.74* 
ROA 0.112 
9.83*** 
0.098 
7.85*** 
0.117 
7.48*** 
0.100 
6.15*** 
-0.027 
-4.63*** 
-0.022 
-4.47*** 
-0.022 
-4.47*** 
Debt to 
Assets 
0.368 
1.17 
-1.024 
-1.62 
0.272 
0.69 
-1.466 
-2.29** 
-0.154 
-0.21 
0.335 
1.00 
0.335 
0.98 
 Asset 
Growth 
-0.287 
-1.62 
-0.333 
-1.96* 
-0.204 
-0.91 
-0.261 
-1.29 
-0.001 
-0.01 
0.016 
0.32 
0.016 
0.32 
Book-to-
Market 
 
-0.020 
-2.67*** 
 
-0.024 
-3.31*** 
 
0.007 
1.68* 
0.007 
1.66* 
Log Assets       
0.0003 
0.04 
Adj. R- 
squared 
0.278 0.306 0.301 0.343 0.428 0.513 0.513 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
F-test 32.30 34.39 24.14 29.64 16.93 16.61 14.08 
*P < 0.1, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01   
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TABLE 5  
Linear regression analysis investigating the effect of interacting years with the RMD score 
and ROA on the association between RMD and firm stock price changes, return S.D along 
with the selected control variables. 
Dependent 
variable  
Price change 
Price change with 
dividends 
Return S.D 2010-2011 
 
Equation 
I. 
Equation 
II. 
Equation 
III. 
Equation 
IV. 
Equation 
V. 
Equation 
VI. 
Equation 
VII. 
Independent 
variables 
Coeff. 
t-value 
Coeff. 
t-value 
Coeff. 
t-value 
Coeff. 
t-value 
Coeff. 
t-value 
Coeff. 
t-value 
Coeff. 
t-value 
Constant 
 
0.792 
1.36 
 
0.859 
1.33 
1.252** 
2.15 
1.290** 
2.02 
-0.155 
-0.79 
-0.156 
-0.83 
-0.156 
-0.79 
RM 
0.208 
0.79 
 
0.500** 
2.16 
0.087 
0.35 
0.481** 
2.32 
-0.101** 
-2.39 
-0.090** 
-2.46 
-0.082** 
-1.73 
ROA 
0.068*** 
4.75 
 
0.085*** 
6.50 
0.057*** 
3.26 
0.088*** 
5.42 
-0.024*** 
-4.64 
-0.021*** 
-5.16 
-0.021*** 
-5.15 
Debt to 
Assets 
-1.096* 
-1.83 
 
-1.045 
-1.56 
-1.570** 
-2.58 
-1.487 
-2.21 
0.330 
1.56 
0.335 
1.59 
0.332 
1.56 
 Asset 
Growth 
-0.340** 
-2.11 
-0.150 
-0.85 
-0.272 
-1.47 
-0.084 
-0.44 
0.015 
0.35 
0.009 
0.23 
0.007 
0.20 
Book-to-
Market 
-0.018** 
-2.65 
-0.021** 
-2.62 
-0.023*** 
-3.23 
-0.025*** 
-3.23 
0.006** 
2.58 
0.006** 
2.56 
 
0.006** 
2.51 
 
Log Assets       
-0.001 
-0.34 
Years-RMD 
 
 
 
-0.619*** 
-6.43 
 
-0.604*** 
-6.36 
 
0.021 
1.47 
0.022 
1.51 
ROA-RMD 
0.341** 
2.19 
 
0.493** 
3.18 
 
0.019 
0.88 
  
Adj. R- 
squared 
 
0.3244 
 
  0.4347 0.3810 0.4627 0.5144 0.5168 0.5169 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
F-test 18.56 25.16 20.35 26.52 14.35 15.45 14.93 
*P < 0.1, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01   
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TABLE 6 
Summary linear regression analysis of the relationship between stock price changes, return 
S.D and the content of the six measured risk types. 
Independent 
variables 
Credit 
risk 
Liquidity 
risk 
Market 
risk 
Interest Rate 
risk 
Operational 
risk 
Legal 
risk 
Dependent 
variables 
Coeff. 
Model 
Adj-R
2
 
Coeff. 
Model 
Adj-R
2
 
Coeff. 
Model 
Adj-R
2
 
Coeff. 
Model 
Adj-R
2
 
Coeff. 
Model 
Adj-R
2
 
Coeff. 
Model 
Adj-R
2
 
Price change 
0.21* 
0.30 
0.38*** 
0.32 
-0.04 
0.29 
0.23* 
0.30 
0.05 
0.30 
0.35** 
0.30 
Return S.D 
2010-2011 
-0.04 
0.51 
-0.66* 
0.52 
-0.01 
0.50 
-0.03* 
-0.50 
-0.02* 
0.50 
-0.004 
0.49 
*P < 0.1, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01  
 
